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Counting as Citizens: Recognition of the
Nubians in the 2009 Kenyan Census
SAMANTHA BALATON-CHRIMES
Monash University, Australia
ABSTRACT This article uses the case of the Nubians in Kenya as an ethnic minority, and the 2009
Kenyan census as a particular form of recognition, to engage in a particular aspect of the debates
surrounding the politics of recognition: the perceived competitive nature of the relationship
between national and subnational groups, in this case ethnic groups. Using data obtained during a
6-month qualitative study conducted over the census period, this paper evaluates the response of
some members of the Nubian community to their participation in the census, focusing on its most
controversial question, ‘What tribe are you?’ The article concludes that the dynamic between
ethnic and national identities and allegiances, when the former are recognized, can be the site of
agency, participatory citizenship, and therefore also democratic equality, action and interaction.
Introduction
There are few tools more widely used and more controversial than a census for counting
and knowing national populations. In divided societies, there is great potential for a census
to unite the population through participation in a national ritual, or deepen divisions and
marginalize certain groups further by categorizing, coding and naming, or not naming
(Hirschman, 1987; Urla, 1993; Kertzer & Arel, 2002; Uvin, 2002; Ferrando, 2008).
Censuses offer unique and highly significant forms of recognition. Little of the literature
on the politics of censuses has focused on Africa, and none to my knowledge on Kenya,
which since the 2008 post-election violence has been widely recognized as one of the most
divided societies on the continent.1 For many members of the formerly migrant commu-
nity of Nubians in Kenya, the 2009 census was a significant but by no means sufficient step
forward in shifting from stateless people widely perceived as foreigners to citizens, and in
providing the opportunity for a more inclusive experience of citizenship.
This paper uses the case of the Nubians in Kenya as an ethnic minority, and the 2009
Kenyan census as a particular form of recognition, to engage in a particular aspect of
the debates surrounding the politics of recognition and national citizenship. The impor-
tance of recognition of our unique identities is now a well-established norm in political
theory; however, beyond this notion there is very little agreement on how much difference
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and which kinds of identity should be recognized, in what contexts, and through what
mechanisms in a democracy. To put it briefly, fears include: the potential for oppression
if identities are ascribed rather than chosen (as is usually the case with ethnicity) and
related concerns about intra-group oppression, for example that based on gender, age or
sexuality (Gutmann, 2003); concerns about what recognition of non-civic identities will
do to the spirit of democracy and our willingness and ability to engage with each other
in constructive ways (Elshtain, 1998); and, finally, worries about the potential effects of
recognition on social cohesion at the national level (Kymlicka, 1996). In this article,
only a small aspect of this debate is addressed, that which is concerned with the erosion
of national identities and allegiances in favour of subgroup (in this case ethnic) ones.
In doing so, only one element of citizenship is drawn on, that concerned with identity,
membership in a political community and a sense of belonging, bracketing for the most
part, and for the purpose of analytical clarity, rights claims and civic participation, touch-
ing on these aspects only where they intersect with the first. It is argued that the recognition
afforded to the Nubians in the 2009 census demonstrates that subnational group
recognition is not only compatible with but can also in fact support and strengthen national
identity and loyalties.
The analysis draws on qualitative field research conducted from March to October 2009
with the Nubian community of Kibera, Nairobi, primarily semi-structured individual inter-
views with a broad spectrum of community members.2 It also adopts a qualitative analysis
of media coverage of the census around August 2009, and participant observation over the
census period. First, the conceptual importance of censuses in general is outlined, and their
particular importance in the Kenyan context, then there is a brief explanation of the place
of the Nubians in previous censuses, and this is compared with the 2009 census. The paper
concludes with some comments about the contribution this case makes to thinking about
the perceived competitive nature of the relationship between ethnicity and nationality.
Census Categories
In the 2009 Kenyan census the most controversial question, in particular given the
recent memory of the 2007–2008 post-election violence, was ‘What tribe are you?’3
The emotive nature of this question is demonstrated by the withholding of the results
from this question in the 1999 census, the government deeming them too sensitive for
public release. Concern about the potential misuse of the statistics was widespread;
however, despite this fear, a significant school of thought argued that tribe is part of
who Kenyans are and should not be ignored, so the question should be asked (see e.g.
Okulo, 2009). This camp was broadly pitted against those who could not see the relevance
of tribe in development planning, seeing only potential for misuse of the figures to direct
development funds to ‘one’s own’ (see e.g. Wanyeki, 2009).4
In the weeks leading up to the census, the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS)
and the government tried to defend the inclusion of the tribe question, consistently claim-
ing that the census is simply a tool for government planning.5 The head of the KNBS,
Anthonly Kilele, said, ‘Most people are looking at the question on tribe as a tool for
political purposes. Yes, I know some people can use statistics badly given the chance,
but let us not bring politics into every issue, as this will be a purely professional exercise.
We are getting the information so that it can be used by planners and for statistical reasons’
(Kiare, 2009).
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It is widely accepted, however, that there is no such thing as an apolitical, neutral, purely
‘scientific’ census. The timing, method of enumeration and, most importantly, the ques-
tions asked, all do more than simply describe the population, they shape the population,
the citizenry, both in the historical record and in the moment of enumeration, in the inter-
action between enumerator as state agent, and citizen. Censuses, like all statistics, do not
simply deliver apolitical data, they have a more profound meaning and use (Andersen,
1983; Urla, 1993; Ferrando, 2008; Starkweather, 2009). As such, the information gathered
in a national census is highly politically charged and emotive. As David Kertzer &
Dominique Arel (2002, p. 36) argue, in a census ‘[w]e witness the struggle among a
multiplicity of actors over that most basic of powers, the power to name, to categorize,
and thus to create social reality’.
The choice to categorize, and then choices about which categories to use, gives census
makers an extraordinary amount of power to determine what is known about the country,
what is not known, and what options people have to identify themselves. Sixty-five per
cent of countries that conduct national censuses insist on categorizing individuals by
ethnicity at the same time as counting them as part of the national whole (Morning,
2008, p. 239). As Kertzer & Arel (2002, p. 19) explain, ‘to assume that categories denoting
cultural affiliation can be enumerated as objectively as age is to assume that identities can
be reduced to an essential core within each individual, a core that exists outside of
politics’. The public debates that often surround these kinds of question in national cen-
suses attest to the fact that there is no simple way to classify people. Benedict Andersen
highlights the tension between the census as a nation-building exercise and simultaneously
as a method of dividing up the population into knowable, countable subcategories that
are acceptable to the state and its people when he says, ‘census makers [have a] passion
for completeness and unambiguity. Hence their intolerance of multiple, politically
“transvestite”, blurred or changing identifications’ (Andersen, 1983, p. 166). In this way,
categorization in the census can throw national cohesion and the supposedly superior
salience of national identity and community into question.
Kenya can be considered a paradigmatic case of a highly political census environment.
In Kenya, the popular belief that the country is made up of 42 tribes comes not from any
constitutional or legislative list, but from the available codes dictated by the state for
answering the tribe question in the 1969–1999 decennial censuses.6 As such, the census
has been the primary site of official recognition of ethnic groups throughout Kenya’s inde-
pendence. The intimate connection between the census and recognition as Kenyan was
exploited in its advertising campaign, which announced ‘Nipo!’ (I am here!) and
‘Natambulika!’ (I am recognized!), alongside photos of 28 different faces representing
the socio-economic, racial and cultural diversity of the country. Although not an official
policy, the 42 tribes recognized in past censuses benefit in practice to preferential
access to public goods such as educational bursaries and also to employment opportunities
in the armed forces, police and civil service, in their districts of origin, which were redrawn
after the 1962 census to reflect geographical distribution of tribes better (Statistics
Division, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Government of Kenya
Colony, 1966, p. 36). This is what made it so significant that in the 2009 census all
minority and sub-tribes in Kenya were coded for the first time, more than doubling the
number of tribal codes by including some newly recognized tribes and breaking down
others into umbrella and sub-tribes. The reasons for this major change in the enumeration
of ethnic identity are not clear; however, it is likely that it was influenced, at least in part,
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by the lobbying of small and sub-tribes, as well as by the increased sensitivity around the
issue after the post-election violence of 2007–2008. Among those who were counted as a
tribe for the first time (notably not as a sub-tribe) were the Nubians.
The Nubians of Kenya
Kenyan Nubians trace their origins to the Egyptian slave armies of the nineteenth century,
and more particularly to the forces abandoned in Equatoria and subsequently recruited into
the Imperial British East Africa Company forces. These approximately 10,000 Soudanese,
as they were called then, later became the King’s African Rifles, Britain’s East African
colonial force (Hansen, 1991; Nasseem & Marjan, 1992; Johnson, 2009).7 On completing
their military service they were settled in various parts of Uganda and Kenya, the largest
settlement in Kenya being Kibera in Nairobi, or Kibra as it is known to the Nubians,
which means ‘forest’ in Kinubi, the Numbian language. It is an area that is now one of
Africa’s most notorious slums, most of whose present inhabitants belong to other ethnic
communities.
After World War II and particularly as the Mau Mau rebellion took hold of Kenya in the
1950s and independence loomed, the Nubians became a thorn in the side of the colonial
Kenyan government. Though there was reasonably wide agreement that they had a
moral claim to the land they were settled on by virtue of their military service and extended
occupation of the area, the legal nature of this claim was always ambiguous. The Nubians
thought they were given the land to own, whereas the British still considered it Crown
Land, and increasingly valuable land at that, and thought of the Nubians as ‘tenants at
will’. The Nubians were considered ‘detribalized natives’ because of the severance of
their connection with communities in Sudan, and the semi-urban lifestyle they had devel-
oped. The Nubians were not like the other African tribes the British had subjugated in
Kenya, and the colonial government was generally unsure what to do with them, or
their land claims. Originally loyal servants of the Crown, as the need for their military
service decreased they came to occupy a liminal status in the country: subject to neither
settler law nor any Native Authority (Parsons, 1997, pp. 113–114).
This liminal status has never been fully resolved. In today’s terms it can be legally
reframed as being neither citizen nor foreigner, but rather stateless. As individuals,
Nubians have, at least until the last 4 years, faced severe discrimination in the acquisition
of national identity cards, which in Kenya constitute proof of citizenship (Kenya National
Commission of Human Rights (KNCHR), 2007; Adam, 2009; Manby, 2009; Sing’Oei,
2009).8 This discrimination appears to have at least two bases. First, there exists a
widespread perception that the Nubians are still foreigners, and foreigners with a close
historical association with the colonizer and little well-known involvement in the indepen-
dence struggle. Second, their Muslim faith also contributes to the discriminatory treatment
for a complex array of reasons, including the cross-border nature of many predominantly
Muslim ethnic groups, particularly Somalis who suffer similar discrimination, and Kenya’s
cooperation with the USA in counter-terrorism efforts (KNCHR, 2007; Kenya Human
Rights Commission, 2009).9
Many Nubians feel their physical as well as legal place in Kenya is also somewhat
liminal, as they have no ‘rural home’ like other Kenyan communities. The land they
live on has economic, security, heritage and recognition value for the community. As a
result of its proximity to the Central Business District and Industrial Area, which makes
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it exceptionally valuable, the struggle for land in Kibera remains one of the most conten-
tious land problems in the country. The Nubians continue to petition the President and
the rime Minister (separately) to grant them communal land title over the area so that
they may erect permanent structures to make economic use of the area as landlords, so
that they have a place where they will be safe with each other in the event of any inter-
ethnic violence, and so that they may finally have assurance that the area they consider
their ancestral land will not be encroached upon any further.10 Although the Nubian com-
munity, like all communities, contains internal divisions, particularly around age and
gender, but also in relation to their support for various political parties and projects, the
themes of discrimination and mis- or non-recognition outlined here affect almost all
members of the community in some way.
The Nubians could be variously considered foreigners, former migrants, non-natives or
‘strangers’, depending on your perspective or theoretical disposition.11 It is historically
true that the Nubians descend from a number of Sudanese ethnic groups encountered in
their migration, putting them in the complex position of having their contemporary iden-
tity defined by a national rather than straightforwardly mono-ethnic origin. Furthermore,
their Muslim identity is every bit as strong if not more so than their tribal identity. These
facts dominate perceptions of the Nubians, placing them in a position of having to find
grounds on which to articulate first their visibility (as opposed to invisibility in the
category of ‘Other’), and second their Kenyanness. In response to this, most Nubians
strongly resist a contemporary identification with Sudanese nationality, and some
Nubians have begun to adopt a self-identifying discourse of indigeneity, or even auto-
chthony, based on their forefathers’ clearing of the forest to create Kibra. Some
Nubians also emphasize aspects of their history that are consistent with Kenya’s contem-
porary goals as an independent African nation and downplay those historical circum-
stances that ally them with other countries, particularly Britain and Sudan. The
uncertainty surrounding Nubian citizenship and their place (physical and metaphysical)
in Kenya is not unusual. Increasingly in countries such as Coˆte d’Ivoire and the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo among others, minority migrant and ‘stranger’ groups are
using identity politics to fight for not only rights, particularly to own land and vote, but
also inclusive citizenship. The national census is just one of a range of mechanisms that
affect, or have the potential to facilitate, the integration of such groups in diverse societies.
In the Kenyan census, we see tribal identity emerge as the currency of legitimate claims to
national belonging.
Though it is unclear, prior to 2009 it seems the Nubians were counted in the category
of ‘Non-African—Sudanese’, ‘Others—Kenyan’ or ‘Others—Non-Kenyan’, all poorly
defined terms that, even if ‘Others—Kenyan’, suggest non-citizens. For example, where
the categories originate in the 1969 census, it says, ‘Africans who are nationals of
Kenya are shown by tribe’ (Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning, Government of the Republic of Kenya, 1970, p. ii). ‘Others’ are almost cer-
tainly the most politically charged group to emerge from a census, absorbing inexplic-
able anomalies that do not fit in a given year into the census makers’ understanding of
the ethnic, religious or linguistic make-up of the national community (Andersen, 1983,
pp. 166–170). Among the Nubians, the feelings associated with being relegated to this
category were predictably negative. Many described it as embarrassing or humiliating,
‘like the other tribes who are just here by mistake’ (Muhidin,12 interview with author,
3 September 2009), or as diminuitive in other ways, like being considered foreigners,
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children, vagrants or even animals. Hassan (interview with author, 30 September 2009)
thought the label might be because ‘we used to be called like refugee, they used to refer
to come from Sudan’, a notion Hassan and many of his peers associate with a distant
past. In some cases it was even perceived as not being visible or audible at all; for
example, Jamia (interview with author, 5 September 2009) said, ‘We are so minority
that no one even could consider . . . even if you go to the hospital you will be asked,
“Nubi—from where? Sudan?” You see! You will just be like, “Oh god, I am nothing
in Kenya!” So our voices could not be heard.’
In comparison, the 2009 census offered the Nubians a different experience. Various
studies are emerging of the way in which census design is becoming more participatory
(Urla, 1993; Kertzer & Arel, 2002; Starkweather, 2009). Though it is not entirely clear
what prompted the decision to code the Nubians, the Kenya Nubian Council of Elders
(KNCE) had been petitioning the government for a census code for some time, and
were officially notified by the Minister of State Planning, National Development and
Vision 2030 in a letter dated 24 April 2009 that, ‘you shall be encoded as the 43rd tribe
of Kenya during the August 2009 census’ (private communication). In the end they
were not coded as the 43rd tribe specifically, but rather as one of many more tribes.
This means the Nubians did not achieve identification as one of the ‘big tribes’,
however the code still represented recognition of their tribe as one of Kenya, a novelty
for the community. Both the code itself and the experience of being enumerated were
sites of recognition for the Nubians.
In a common exercise of agency expressed through a claim for recognition, some
participants, particularly women, talked of boycotting the census if they were not coded.
The following narrative of Zuhura (interview with author, 30 August 2009) demonstrates
this point:
. . . I heard a knock at the door, and I opened the door and I saw them with their t-
shirts, showing that they are the ones participating in the sensa [census] with the
badge, and bags, so I come and let them inside and I told them, ‘But wait first.’
First I remember I didn’t tell them to sit down. I told them, ‘You know I am a
Nubian, and can you check in your list if my name is there? My tribe name? And
if I have a code? . . . I have to ask you before you start your work.’ One of them
took a book and looked inside the book and he told me, ‘Ah mama! Here is your
tribe’s name and code’, and I told them, ‘Ah welcome, have a seat.’ and then they
asked me, ‘You couldn’t let us sit before you saw that?’ and I told them, ‘Yeah! If
I didn’t have a code the way you entered my house is the same way you will use
going, because I was not ready for the counting.’ So they sat down, they started the
questioning. I answered them very well, and I was very happy to see my tribe now
has a name in Kenya’s documents, and a code. And I felt very happy.
In this passage Zuhura refused even to entertain agents of the state except on certain
conditions, specifically that they recognize her identity as Nubian. However, not only
were they required to recognize her tribe to gain her cooperation, but they also had to
do so in ‘Kenya’s documents’ specifically. Once these conditions were met, she not
only cooperated, but also welcomed the enumerators, the state, into her home and,
‘answering very well’, demonstrated not just willingness, but enthusiasm to cooperate
and do what was required by the state for the nation.
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Even by those who may not have participated in the boycott, the coding of the Nubians in
the 2009 census represented a form of recognition that for many made them feel known and
proud. Jamia (interview with author, 5 September 2009) summed up the feeling when she
said, ‘Even somebody told me, “Nimetambulika! Najulikana!” [I have been recognized!
I am known/understood!] . . . For the first time since I was in Kenya! This time I was
known! That I was there!’
The responses of participants such as Zuhura suggest that recognition in the census
carried two kinds of ontological benefit. The first benefit is what Kertzer & Arel (2002,
pp. 20–21) describe as the production of ‘true’ and ‘real’ identities, the ‘nominat[ion
of] ethnic groups into existence’. Identity does not just benefit from but is actually depen-
dent on recognition from others of that identity. Charles Taylor (1994, p. 25) explains this
best when he says: ‘our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real
distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or
demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves’. Taylor’s thesis can help us understand
the feelings described by the participants above when they were counted as ‘Others’—they
felt like foreigners, vagrants or animals—compared with their feelings when counted as
Nubians, where they felt visible, known and proud. It could be argued the significance
for those who responded ‘Nubian’ was more than just affective satisfaction. It was in
fact an affirmation of their identity.
The second benefit, which will admittedly require the release of the census results,
which to date (June 2010) has been stalled, is that the Nubians will for the first time
know themselves in a meaningful statistical way, including the most basic of figures:
their population. Yusuf Ibrahim Diab, Secretary of the KNCE (interview with author,
7 September 2009), said, ‘We want to know how many we are, the distribution and the
resourcefulness, educational capacities . . . We sort of want to have a databank of the
Nubian community, that we can use . . . to challenge ourselves that there are certain
things we can do for ourselves.’ It is for this very reason that the KNCE also conducted
an independent shadow census, sponsored by the Open Society Institute for East Africa,
in December 2009. After decades of not knowing how many they are, with estimates
ranging between 6,000 (widely thought in the community to be a severe underestimate)
and 200,000, many are looking forward finally to having a credible figure to define them-
selves. As well as the ontological benefits of simply knowing, it was thought particularly
important to know this information to be better equipped to lobby the government for
resources and especially land title.
These feelings of satisfaction and pride at being recognized as Nubian can be distin-
guished from, but often exist in tandem with, those that were more specifically associated
with being recognized as Kenyan Nubians. The census was widely perceived not just as a
counting exercise (which it in effect was, for everyone in the country was counted,
including foreigners), but as an exercise in the validation of Kenyan citizenship.
‘Amina’ (interview with author, 1 September 2009) described how the census code
changed how she felt about the place of her tribe among the others in Kenya:
To me, it is good, finally we are being recognized. But still, I mean the whole nation,
and all the other tribes you know they cannot absorb. They know it is 42 . . . But ah
kind of it makes me feel like being somewhere. At least when people start talking
about 42 tribes, I say no! It’s 43, and my tribe is the 43rd tribe. And then when
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they say that, they kind of ask me, ‘How? Who are you?’—‘I am a Nubian!’ And
then it gives me the opportunity to explain who Nubians are, how they came about.
Though the coding did not place the Nubians as 43rd of 43 tribes, but rather gave them
code ‘220’, ‘Amina’s’ comments are testament to the salience of the perceived system
of recognition and the desire to be included in that system. Issa Abdul Faraj, Chairman
of KNCE (interview with author, 9 September 2009), echoes ‘Amina’ when he says,
‘the government has recognised us as the 43rd indigenous tribe of Kenya, which means
we are like everybody else, like the big tribes, the Kikuyu, the Luo, the Kalenjin,
Maasai, you name them, Luhya. So you have the Nubians.’ These comments explicitly
raise what is particular about the case of Kenya; because the government already recog-
nizes tribes, the claims of the Nubians for the same are nothing more than claims for
equal treatment. A code in the census does not represent any special or preferential treat-
ment, but rather puts their community on a par with others as part of the legitimate ethnic
make-up of Kenya, entitled to the same understanding and resources afforded to other
Kenyan tribes. This is indicative of the extent to which collective (tribal) recognition is
necessary in Kenya for any sense of belonging to the nation.
Even in cases that initially suggest a rejection of tribal identity, the dynamic of recog-
nition at play is more complex. A movement named ‘Tribe Kenya’ tried to convince
people to identify their tribe as ‘Kenyan’, an option available for the first time in the
2009 census. This movement was supported by those who question the distinction
between tribe and tribalism, believing tribes to be at the root of many of Kenya’s problems.
This anti-tribe, or at least anti-tribalist sentiment, has its place in the Nubian community as
in any other, and some participants reported choosing ‘Kenyan’ as their tribe. For example,
‘Zeddy’ (interview with author, 1 October 2009) said, ‘I’ll just tell them I am a Kenyan,
because I am of course. I would just tell them I’m a Kenyan. I wouldn’t say I’m a Nubian,
and even if I say I’m a Nubian, still I’m a Kenyan, yeah?’ ‘Zeddy’ demonstrates what
could be interpreted as a superior allegiance to her Kenyan identity, but she is quick
also to defend her Nubian one, and their compatibility. In fact, she is confused as to
why such compatibility would be contested. For ‘Zeddy’, being a Nubian simply is
being a Kenyan.13
The choices people made to be counted, and how they were counted, were of course not
motivated only by the drive for recognition, but also by the prospect of tangible benefits,
the beginning of access to ‘our fair share of the national cake’ (Muhidin, interview with
author, 3 September 2009). As Kenya operates on an unofficial quota system for ethnic
groups to access employment in the military, police and public service, it was hoped
that the code would lead to increased access to these sought after opportunities, as well
as constituency development funds and educational bursaries. However, the most pressing
need of the community and therefore the most referenced in discussions of the benefits
of receiving a code in the census is land. The struggle for land title for Kibera has been
at the centre of the political activity and the concerns of the community since before
independence, and it is a struggle that has intensified in recent years since the inception
of the Kenya Slum Upgrading Project, which seriously threatens the likelihood of the
Nubians’ receiving the title deed. Land was thought by many participants to be one of
the reasons why the code in the census was so long in coming, and was one of the
primary benefits they hoped to gain from the 2009 code. As Zuhura (interview with
author, 30 August 2009) explained, ‘So we are hoping now even the land will belong to
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us. Because we’ve already been given a code. We’re already included in the country . . . so
they must give us our right. And our right as Kenyans—we need our land first.’
These expressions of hope for more concrete benefits beyond the recognition entailed in
the code itself can be understood as instances of the politics of redistribution. Some critics
point to the limits of recognition alone in redressing the injustices that result from mis- or
non-recognition, injustices that are more concrete and tangible than ontological and
identity insecurity (Fraser, 1997). These injustices have been expressed in the responses
of participants above and can be summed up as unequal access to resources. Elizabeth
Kiss (1999) persuasively argues that it need not be an either/or equation when it comes
to resolving whether priority should be given to recognition or redistribution. Kiss explains
that understanding the role of recognition can help us to understand the social harms that
are sources of distributive injustice, without blinding us to the necessity to rectify those
injustices.
What those who argue for redistribution above recognition are right about in the case of
the Nubians is the ease of recognition in comparison with redistribution. Many interview
participants expressed a great deal of scepticism about what the code will really mean for
them in terms of access to resources. There was also a general cynicism that even if
numbers are known, the neglect and marginalization will continue. In fact at the
extreme, some participants felt that the code could be a whitewash of the ‘Nubian ques-
tion’. Makkah (interview with author, 27 September 2009) said, ‘I didn’t feel good, I
just felt like they are just doing it [as a] formality to fool these people’. Though all partici-
pants in this research were counted, at least for Makkah, this scepticism ran so deep she
almost did not think the counting should happen until Nubian citizenship in Kenya was
recognized in more tangible (redistributive) ways: ‘Counting us just like that and we
are others, we are not part of these tribes of Kenya. We are not considered as citizens,
why are they counting us? It doesn’t make sense. Give us the title deed, gazette us,
then count us’. This fear is not unfounded, for the code alone is unlikely to give the
Nubians immediate access to any of these tangible benefits. However, although the redis-
tributive goals may still be some way from being achieved, this recognition does, for the
first time, give the Nubians grounds on which to demand that relevant policies be modified
to account for their interests.
Ethnic Recognition and National Allegiance
The significance that Nubians were able to associate with receiving their own census code,
points to the complexity of citizenship and recognition in divided societies. Recognition in
the form of a census code gave an institutional context for the multiple and complex modes
of belonging that carry actual salience in their real lives. As such, the code for the Nubians
enabled a meaningful performance of their identity, which had been, to some extent,
historically disabled by non-recognition. Once this option became available, Nubians
were able to claim recognition and work towards redistribution, claiming their right
both to identity and to resources within the wider Kenyan community. The way many
Nubians felt about their participation suggests that multiple solidarities, ethnic and
national, can relate to each other in inclusive, not just competitive ways.
To return to the broader debate, the theoretical tension between ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’
identity (and citizenship) has stemmed in part from a fear that the ethnic would undermine
the national, and as a result national citizens would be less willing to make sacrifices for
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and accommodate each other (Kymlicka, 1996). For some, the fear is that the weakening
or collapse of national identity would signal the collapse of the equality that is a requisite
ingredient for an effective democracy (Elshtain, 1998). Whether the emphasis is on the
identity, membership, rights or civic participation elements of citizenship, national
citizenship is supposed to be the great equalizer, while other sources of identity and
claims on allegiance are seen as a threat to it.
Although we must be ever vigilant of the potential consequences of acting in the inter-
ests of a subnational group, the more sophisticated the recognition debate becomes, the
more it becomes clear that we cannot dismiss non-national identities and allegiances as
simply parochial, subversive and incompatible with healthy national citizenship. The
fear that recognition of other sources of identity—let alone ‘citizenship’, conceived of
as membership and a sense of belonging in a political community—will undermine
national cohesion by diverting loyalties and allegiances to other sources has inhibited fruit-
ful theorizing of alternative forms of citizenship and relations between them, regardless of
how salient they are in reality. Francis Nyamnjoh (2005, p. 38) explains that in ‘real life we
find individuals who are both citizens and subjects, who straddle the “ethnic” and “civic”
citizenship discussed by Mamdani [2001], but who would not accept sacrificing either
permanently. They appropriate both types of citizenship in most creative and fascinating
ways.’ By this Nyamnjoh means that it is not the case that Africans (or anyone else for that
matter) must choose between their tribal and national identity and allegiances, or even that
they must prioritize one permanently over the other. Rather, the dynamic between the two
can itself be a site of agency and participatory citizenship, and therefore also a site of
democratic action and interaction.
Nyamnjoh (2005) goes on more specifically to suggest that subnational identities are
asserted in Africa not to surpass the state, but to reinforce claims on the state and its
resources. He argues that where people feel marginalized, it is because of a failure of the
state to accept their subnational (in this case tribal) identity. Claims for tribal recognition,
therefore, do not necessarily represent claims to supersede or secede from the national
state. Claims for recognition are not always a case of seeking some kind of absolute
autonomy, but rather ‘to become part of, and thereby transform, the state’ (Englund,
2004, p. 3; see also Landau & Misago, 2009, for a good discussion of this in the Kenyan
case). Not only can other sources of identity and calls for allegiance coexist with the
nation, but in cases such as this they actually constitute the currency with which people
make their claims on and contributions to the national community. As Issa Abdul Faraj
(interview with author, 9 September 2009) puts it again: ‘The new code yes it’s good. It’s
recognition . . . It’s empowerment . . . You get a sense of belonging. There is nothing
bigger than a sense of belonging. A sense of ownership. The sense that you are part of
the great effort of Kenya, as a people and as a nation.’ The Nubian case illustrates this point.
As Stephen Ndegwa (1997) argues in his analysis of Kenyan political culture, what is
required is the application of some creativity and imagination to ways in which the
potential competition between allegiances, loyalties and identities can be mitigated.
Given the centrality of ethnic belonging to the realities of so many people in Africa and
elsewhere, a more productive way forward for citizenship theory and institutional
practice would be to explore and advocate practices that encourage convivial relationships
between tribe and nation, and engage the genuine and complex desires of people to belong
to both. Though contentious, coding in national censuses (provided the results are
used appropriately) can be an example of such a practice. For Nubians, recognition and
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inclusion in the Kenyan community in the 2009 census was not about claiming a superior
or competing allegiance, but rather a complementary one. It was not about subverting the
national project, but rather about being included in it.
This article has made a contribution to a narrow but crucially important aspect of the
debates surrounding the politics of recognition. By introducing the case of the Kenyan
Nubians and the institutional practice of census enumeration as empirical examples, the
article has demonstrated one (of many) ways in which recognition can contribute to
building a sense of inclusion and belonging for marginalized groups. Though particular
socio-historical circumstances will always require their own analysis, this article has
argued that ethnic and national identities and allegiances can coexist and support each
other. Far from fuelling competing and undemocratic claims, certain forms of recognition
can in fact contribute to creating the circumstances of equality that are necessary for
functioning national democracies. In the words of Hassan (interview with author,
6 May 2009), the Nubians ‘do not want any special favour, just equal rights and justice’.
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Notes
1. For a notable exception, see van de Walle (2006) on the problematic nature of ‘households’ as a unit of
enumeration.
2. There are settlements of Nubians outside Nairobi in Kenya, in Kibigori, Kisii, Kibos, Eldama Ravine,
Kisumu town, Mumias, Bungoma, Isiolo, Meru, Nyanyuki, Nakuru, Mogotio, Kericho, Kapsabit,
Nandi, Kitale, Mombasa, Mazeras and Migori, and a few in Eldoret, Muheroni and Ahero. The
census component of this field research was limited to Nairobi.
3. While this was the most controversial question, the most controversial issue in relation to the census
was undoubtedly the corruption in recruitment of enumerators—prized employment opportunities—
and the ongoing disputes over their payment. It is difficult to overestimate the way in which this issue
overshadowed the tribe question. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this article to explore this
issue further.
4. Apart from these main schools of opinion, there was a smaller group consisting of some tribes (and sub-
tribes) historically counted as ‘Others’ or included in bigger umbrella tribes such as the Kalenjin
or Luhya who pledged to boycott the census (Matoke & Juma, 2009). Nubians were not part of this
initiative. In addition, Kenyans of European or Asian origin are not coded by ‘tribe’, but rather by
‘origin’, and were largely left out of the debates surrounding the tribe question. These groups and
their attitudes towards ethnic coding in the census would be an interesting area for future research.
5. The term ‘tribe’ sometimes carries pejorative connotations of primitivism and often nepotism and
patrimonialism. Nevertheless, in Kenya most people are quick to make a distinction between tribe
and tribalism, the latter being a source of tension and discrimination, the former being a legitimate
source of pride in and attachment to one’s identity and community (Wamwere, 2008, pp. 95–97).
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Given these considerations, and the prevalence of the term in Kenyan political discourse, I use the word
in a considered way devoid of negative value. I use it interchangeably with ‘ethnic group’.
6. The 1969 census that established the 42 tribes explains the selection of available codes as being based on
the 40 tribes of the 1962 census, the last conducted by the colonial government, with the addition of two
groups of Somali (Statistics Division, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Government of
Republic of Kenya, 1970, p. ii). The 1962 census explains ‘. . . the indigenous African and Somali
population of Kenya was grouped into 40 tribes; immigrants were classified by country of origin. The
indigenous tribes were divided into eight major groups on the basis of ethnic, linguistic and geographical
considerations . . . The grouping is of course somewhat arbitrary in many cases’ (Statistics Division,
Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, Government of Kenya Colony, 1966, p. 34). None
of the figures for either ‘Sudanese’ in the 1962 census or ‘Non-Kenyan African—Sudanese’ or ‘Non-
Kenyan African—Others’ in the 1969 census correlates with independent research on population and
housing in Kibera (Clark, 1970; Amis, 1983) and so it is not clear in which category the Nubians
were counted.
7. It is this migration that distinguishes the Kenyan Nubians who are the subject of this article from any
other Nubians in Kenya, including Christian Nubians, or those who migrated after displacement from
Aswan caused by the construction and flooding of the dam.
8. Although the 1963 constitution of Kenya states that any person born in Kenya after independence to a
parent who was also born in Kenya is a citizen, this is difficult to prove, owing to the rarity of birth
certificates for Africans pre-independence (and until recently). While members of one of the 42 recog-
nized tribes are assumed to be born to Kenyan parents, Nubians (and some other groups) are often
required to produce birth certificates of their grandparents and other difficult–to-obtain documentation
to a vetting committee in order to prove their nationality and get an identity card (KNCHR, 2007). The
effect is that the Nubians are still not automatically considered full Kenyan citizens.
9. The question ‘What religion are you?’ faces similar challenges to the tribe question. The results of this
question have never been released, pointing to the complexity of inter-faith relations in Kenya. I am
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing my attention to this issue.
10. Many Nubians want communal rather than individual land ownership, possibly based on the Community
Land Trust model, where the land is owned collectively by a registered Trust representing the commu-
nity, and structures are owned by individuals according to conventional private property norms.
11. Almost no Kenyan Nubians maintain any active links with Sudan. The last request for repatriation was
made during the 1950s under a leadership of elders long since replaced by a younger generation deeply
committed to their place in Kenya. Any remaining families with connections to Sudan cannot be seen as
representative of the community as a whole. See also Johnson (2009). For an exploration of the notion of
the ‘stranger’ in African societies, see Shack & Skinner (1979) and Berry (2001).
12. Names in inverted commas are pseudonyms. Names without inverted comments are genuine and used
with the express permission of the person concerned.
13. It was reported by some participants that enumerators coded their tribe without asking them, or in
contradiction to their stating ‘Kenyan’, based on enumerators’ knowledge of the family. This is contrary
to the explicit instructions in the enumerators’ manuals and training by KNBS.
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